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Febtuary 22, 1988 c\ 
1D: Alan Epstein, Disney Development Corp. 
Juliann Juras, Walt Disney Imagineering 
FROM: Nick Winslow, Harrison Price Co. 
RE: Burbank Entertainment Center - Summary Observations 
On Friday, February 19, the economic planning team for the Burbank 
Entertainment Center met at WDI to reconcile sizing and economics for the 
various components proposed for inclusion in the project. This process 
resulted in an overview assessment of the Burbank project, an examination 
of the design and analytical work conducted, and the implications of the 
Burbank Center findings on the "Disney Center" concept. The following 
paragraphs summarize my thoughts and understanding of the discussion. 
THE DESIGN AND EVALUATION PROCESS 
The process of getting the Burbank analysis to this point has proven to be 
very complex, occasionally cumbersome, objective and creative. To ad-
dress each point: 
Complexity - Developing a concept and economic model for 
the Burbank Entertainment Center required pulling together a 
resource team with a wide range of disciplines to create and 
evaluate a program which was beyond the experience of any 
one of the participants. A great deal of time and energy was 
necessarily spent establishing a common frame of reference for 
all of the participants. Varying understandings of the market, 
location, professional semantics, project scope and the "Disney 
process" had to be articulated and accommodated. It was a 
learning experience for all. The logistics of getting the right 
people together at the right time proved difficult because of 
the size of the planning team, geography, and other commit-
ments. In view of the above, I believe the project was 
conducted with remarkable efficiency and speed without ever 
losing sight of its purpose. Keeping the team intact will signifi-
cantly shorten the learning curve and increase efficiency on the 
next entertainment center project. 
Objectivity - The leadership of the planning team constantly 
challenged all members to put aside prejudices concerning site, 
concept and project components, and deal pragmatically with 
all issues. This insistence on objectivity forced a number of 
revisions in the content and scope of the project based on 
increasingly sound data, and in my opinion resulted in a 
technically solid analysis. 
Creativity - The Burbank Entertainment Center concept went 
beyond amalgamating standard theme park, festival market-
place, and entertainment/dining components into a single place 
and calling it an entertainment center. Cinemagic and Hyper-
drome are both hybrid attractions which were conceived and 
designed in the context of a multi-purpose entertainment 
center, not a major outdoor theme park. The retailing and 
dining concepts proposed for Provedencia and the other 
sections far exceed what has ever been done in a festival mar-
ketplace. The Burbank concept breaks new ground and IS a 
useful model for entertainment centers in other locations. 
BURBANK ASSESSMENT 
The process of reconciling the Burbank development program deemed 
minimally acceptable by all segments of the planning team with market 
realities, including fair and reasonable assumptions for project synergy, 
made it clear that the Burbank Entertainment Center is fundamentally 
unfeasible because of the disequilibrium between project critical mass 
needs and total available market support. For each major project 
component - retail, food and beverage, clubs, and attractions - the critical 
mass necessary to achieve the market penetrations and spending levels 
required to support the project results in a project which is oversized for 
the Burbank location. Conversely, cutting the project down to a size 
supportable by the available market would result in an emasculated 
concept with insufficient critical mass to generate needed attendance and 
spending. A reconciliation of program and economics is thus not possible 
due to the inadequacies of the market. The following findings illustrate 
the problem: 
Retail - The Burbank Entertainment Center program calls for 
195,000 square feet of retail space (excluding Cataport), 
including 155,000 square feet in Provedencia and 26,000 
square feet in Cinemagic. EDC is firm that the program for 
Provedencia is a bare minimum. The retail program for 
Cinemagic is clearly too large and could be reduced, but such a 
reduction would negatively affect patronage to Cinemagic. The 
market for retail space is approximately 172,000 square feet at 
an acceptable level of sales per square foot. The imbalance IS 
largely attributable to the size and character of the close In 
retail market. 
Food & Beverage - The innovative food and beverage pro-
gram proposed for the Burbank center includes 145,000 square 
feet of space, including 64,000 square· feet in Cinemagic and 
158,000 square feet in Provedencia. The market suggest de-
mand for 85,000 square feet of space, largely because of the 
small daytime and evening populations directly available to the 
project. 
C I u b s - The proposed program for clubs includes 86,000 
square feet of space. Market demand is for 65,000 square feet, 
again largely because of the weak evening market. 
Attractions - The attraction components of both Hyperdrome 
and Cinemagic require more space and investment to achieve 
necessary critical mass than the market can support. Under 
even the most optimistic circumstances, Hyperdrome would 
have to be built for $354 per square foot and Cinemagic for 
$477 per square foot, which is not sufficient to cover projected 
costs. The supportable level of investment for Hyperdrome is 
lower than for Cinemagic because it is more reliant on the 
resident market for its support, particularly teens and young 
adults, than Cinemagic. Resident youth markets have higher 
seasonal and daily peaking characteristics than adult and 
tourist markets, resulting in higher design day capacity 
requirements and thus higher investment per guest. The 
Hyperdrome concept would benefit from a location with an 
existing base of young tourist visitors. 
Perhaps the most significant finding of this process was that the entire 
team converged on a concept and scope for a Disney Entertainment Center 
which, with some adjustments for local conditions, was deemed to be 
feasible in a stronger location. 
IMPLICATIONS 
In my opinion, the Burbank exercise proved that a new and unique 
product - a Disney Entertainment Center - can be designed which is worthy 
of Disney involvement and and presents a profitable financial opportunity. 
The Burbank site, unfortunately, poses too great a market risk to offer an 
acceptable financial risk. The design and analysis conducted to date, 
however, provide an excellent base upon which to establish minimum 
market criteria for Disney Centers in other locations. To further our 
understanding of how these centers will function economically, I suggest 
the following general approach: 
• Study all cost to determine fixed and variable costs for each 
component. 
• Using the sizing model, break apart attendance and spending 
characteristics for each market segment. Determine economic 
contribution of each market segment to each project component 
and relate it to propensity to patronize. 
• Establish economic breakeven levels based on assumed cap-
ital and operating costs, and fixed and variable costs. 
• Back into a matrix of market characteristic minimums 
needed to achieve the minimally acceptable level of financial 
performance. 
This process is not intended to provide a definitive assessment of 
feasibility at a given location, but should enable Disney to preliminarily 
screen potential markets prior to going into a more exhaustive, and 
expensive, drill. 
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Alan Epstein, Disney Development Corp. 
Juliann Juras, Walt Disney Imagineering 
FROM: Nick Winslow, Harrison Price Co. 
RE: Burbank Entertainment Center - Summary Observations 
On Friday, February 19, the economic planning team for the Burbank 
Entertainment Center met at WDI to reconcile sizing and economics for the 
various components proposed for inclusion in the project. This process 
resulted in an overview assessment of the Burbank project, an examination 
of the design and analytical work conducted, and the implications of the 
Burbank Center findings on the "Disney Center" concept. The following 
paragraphs summarize my thoughts and understanding of the discussion. 
THE DESIGN AND EVALUATION PROCESS 
The process of getting the Burbank analysis to this point has proven to be 
very complex, occasionally cumbersome, objective and creative. To ad-
dress each point: 
Complexity - Developing a concept and economic model for 
the Burbank Entertainment Center required pulling together a 
resource team with a wide range of disciplines to create and 
evaluate a program which was beyond the experience of any 
one of the participants. A great deal of time and energy was 
necessarily spent establishing a common frame of reference for 
all of the participants. Varying understandings of the market, 
location, professional semantics, project scope and the "Disney 
process" had to be articulated and accommodated. It was a 
learning experience for all. The logistics of getting the right 
people together at the right time proved difficult because of 
the size of the planning team, geography, and other commit-
ments. In view of the above, I believe the project was con-
ducted with remarkable efficiency and speed without ever 
losing sight of its purpose. Keeping the team intact will signifi-
cantly shorten the learning curve and increase efficiency on the 
next entertainment center project. 
Objectivity - The leadership of the planning team constantly 
challenged all members to put aside prejudices concerning site, 
concept and project components, and deal pragmatically with 
all issues. This insistence on objectivity forced a number of 
revisions in the content and scope of the project based on 
increasingly sound data, and in my opinion resulted in a tech-
nically solid analysis. 
Creativity - The Burbank Entertainment Center concept went 
beyond amalgamating standard theme park, festival market-
place, and entertainment/dining components into a single place 
and calling it an entertainment center. Cinemagic and Hyper-
drome are both hybrid attractions which were conceived and 
designed in the context of a multi-purpose entertainment 
center, not a major outdoor theme park. The retailing and 
dining concepts proposed for Providencia and the other 
sections far exceed what has ever been done in a festival mar-
ketplace. The Burbank concept breaks new ground and ts a 
useful model for entertainment centers in other locations. 
BURBANK ASSESSMENT 
The process of reconciling the Burbank development program deemed 
minimally acceptable by all segments of the planning team with market 
realities, including fair and reasonable assumptions for project synergy, 
made it clear that the Burbank Entertainment Center is fundamentally 
unfeasible because of the disequilibrium between project critical mass 
needs and total available market support. For each major project 
component - retail, food and beverage, clubs, and attractions - the critical 
mass necessary to achieve the market penetrations and spending levels 
required to support the project results in a project which is oversized for 
the Burbank location. Conversely, cutting the project down to a size 
supportable by the available market would result in an emasculated 
concept with insufficient critical mass to generate needed attendance and 
spending. A reconciliation of program and economics is thus not possible 
due to the inadequacies of the market. The following findings illustrate 
the problem: 
Retail - The Burbank Entertainment Center program calls for 
195,000 square feet of retail space (excluding Cataport), 
including 155,000 square feet in Providencia and 26,000 
square feet in Cinemagic. EDC is firm that the program for 
Providencia is a bare minimum. The retail program for 
Cinemagic is clearly too large and could be reduced, but such a 
reduction would negatively affect patronage to Cinemagic. The 
market for retail space is approximately 172,000 square feet at 
an acceptable level of sales per square foot. The imbalance of 
total project retail is largely attributable to the size and 
character of the close in retail market. 
Food & Beverage - The innovative food and beverage pro-
gram proposed for the Burbank center includes 145,000 square 
feet of space, including 64,000 square feet in Cinemagic and 
58,000 square feet in Providencia. The market suggest de-
mand for 85,000 square feet of space, largely because of the 
small weekday evening populations directly available to the 
project. 
C I u b s - The proposed program for clubs, which is considered 
the minimum necessary to achieve adequate critical mass, 
consists of 94,000 square feet of space. Market demand is for 
77,000 square feet, again largely because of the modest 
weekday evening market. 
Attractions - The attraction components of both Hyperdrome 
and Cinemagic require more space and investment to achieve 
necessary critical mass than the market can support. Under 
even the most optimistic circumstances, Hyperdrome would 
have to be built for $354 per square foot and Cinemagic for 
$4 77 per square foot, which is not sufficient to cover projected 
costs. The supportable level of investment for Hyperdrome is 
lower than for Cinemagic because it is more reliant on the 
resident market for its support, particularly teens and young 
adults, than Cinemagic. Resident youth markets have higher 
seasonal and daily peaking characteristics than adult and 
tourist markets, resulting in higher design day capacity 
requirements and thus higher investment per guest. The 
Hyperdrome concept would benefit from a location with an 
existing base of young tourist visitors. 
Perhaps the most significant finding of this process was that the entire 
team converged on a concept and scope for a Disney Entertainment Center 
which, with some adjustments for local conditions, was deemed to be 
feasible in a stronger location. 
1M PLICA TIONS 
In my opinion, the Burbank exercise proved that a new and unique 
product - a Disney Entertainment Center - can be designed which is worthy 
of Disney involvement and and presents a profitable financial opportunity. 
The Burbank site, unfortunately, poses too great a market risk to offer an 
acceptable financial risk. The design and analysis conducted to date, 
however, provide an excellent base upon which to establish minimum 
market criteria for Disney Centers in other locations. To further our 
understanding of how these centers will function economically, I suggest 
the following general approach: 
• Study all costs to determine fixed and variable costs for each 
component. 
• Further refine the analysis of alternative gating strategies. 
• Using the sizing model, break apart attendance and spending 
characteristics for each market segment based on geography, 
demography, lifestyle and tourist/resident split. Determine 
economic contribution of each market segment to each project 
component and relate it to propensity to patronize. 
• Establish economic breakeven levels based on assumed cap-
ital and operating costs, and fixed and variable costs. 
• Back into a matrix of market characteristic minimums 
needed to achieve the minimally acceptable level of financial 
performance. 
This process is not intended to provide a definitive assessment of 
feasibility at a given location, but should enable Disney to preliminarily 
screen potential markets prior to going into a more exhaustive, and 
expensive, drill. 
BURBANK ENTERTAINMENT CENTER 
Hyperdrome-Preliminary Economic Test 
DERIVATION OF NOI 
Attendance(OOO) 13000 13000 13500 13500 13 750 
Per Capita $9.00 $11.00 $9.00 $11.00 $9.00 
Gross Revenue($000)9 ,00011,000 13,500 16,500 15,750 
NOI @ 30% of Gross2,700 3,300 4,050 4,950 4,725 
SUPPORTABLE INVESTMENTf$000) 
@8% Cap. Rate 33,750 41,250 50,625 61,875 59,062 
@9% Cap. Rate 30,000 36,667 45,000 55,000 52,500 
@ 10% Cap. Rate 27,000 33,000 40,500 49,500 4 7,250 
MEDIAN SIZING PARAMETERS 
Hourly Ent. Cap.(units)5,6885,688 8,533 8,533 9,950 
Gross Floor Area (s.f.)146.2 146.2 219.4 219.4 256.0 
FEASIBLE COST PARAMETERS 
Cost per Ent. Unit(9%)5,274 6,446 5,274 6,446 5,276 
Cost per Square Foot205 251 205 251 205 
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Hyperdrome Preliminary Findings 
• Hyperdrome is an attractive concept which would fill a void in 
the teen market - a place to go which would have more action 
than a mall but be less expensive and require less commitment 
than a visit to Magic Mountain. 
• Attendance patterns at Hyperdrome would most likely be 
comparable to those of Magic Mountain because of its teen 
orientation, i.e. 85% resident attendance. It would have less 
seasonal and weekly peaking because it is indoors, proximate to 
the market, and easily accessible for short periods of time on 
weeknights. 
• Capture rate and length of stay would both be lower than Magic 
Mountain (2.8 million attendance) because of the more limited 
scope of the attraction. Capture rates would be significantly 
higher than a teen club. There are no direct comparables; 
however, attendance between the Tier 2 and Tier 3 attractions 
appears reasonable - a range of 1 to 2 million. 
• The scope of the attraction as proposed suggests an average 
visitor length of stay of 2.5 to 3 hours, based on prevtous 
experience at other enclosed attractions. 
• The scope and length of stay suggest a total in-facility per cap of 
$9.00 to $11.00, based on the experience at other enclosed 
attractions. An additional +/- $3.00 will be spent in the Disney 
Center but outside the attraction. 
• To meet an attendance goal of 1.5 million, the Hyperdrome 
should have at least 8,500 units of hourly entertainment 
capacity and 200,000 square feet. Current planning parameters 
of 6,900 units of hourly entertainment capacity and 110,000 
square feet of gross floor area are not sufficient to accommodate 
attendance of 1.5 million. 
• Supportable investment at 1.5 million attendance is $45 to $55 
million. Total supportable costs translate into $5,274 to $6,446 
per unit of hourly entertainment capacity, or $205 to $251 per 
square foot of the attraction. 
BURBANK ENTERTAINMENT CENTER 
Hyperdrome-Preliminary Economic Test 
DERIVATION OF NOI 
Attendance(OOO) 13000 13000 13500 13500 13 750 
Per Capita $9.00 $11.00 $9.00 $11.00 $9.00 
Gross Revenue($000)9 ,00011,000 13,500 16,500 15,750 
NOI @ 30% of Gross2,700 3,300 4,050 4,950 4,725 
SUPPORTABLE INVESTMENT($000) 
@8% Cap. Rate 33,750 41 ,250 50,625 61,875 59,062 
@9% Cap. Rate 30,000 36,667 45,000 55,000 52,500 
@ 10% Cap. Rate 27,000 33,000 40,500 49,500 4 7,250 
MEDIAN SIZING PARAMETERS 
Hourly Ent. Cap.(units)5,6885,688 8,533 8,533 9,950 
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BURBANK ENTERTAINMENT CENTER 
Proposed Attractions 
HYPERDROME 
• Key features 
- "Gated teen club" featuring a mix of thrill rides, 
games, quick food and novelty retail. 
- No direct comparables. Not a theme park. Not 
a teen club in the strict sense. Functions as a 
hybrid - a cross between hanging out in a mall 
or Westwood, and a visit to Magic Mountain. 
- Alcohol? Doubtful. 
- Strongest market will be teens residing within 
30 minutes of the site. Tourist appeal will be 
modest. 
• Sizing 
- Currently sized at 110,000 square feet, 
including 10,000 s.f. of retail, 10,000 s.f. of food 
service, 40,000 s.f. backstage, and 50,000 s.f. of 
public space. 
- Hourly entertainment capacity has not been set 
by design team. 
WORLD OF DISNEY 
• Concept 
Gated attraction with three distinct theme area: 
1) The Disney Story 
2) Magic of Moviemaking 
3) Disney Center Tour (possibly an add-on 
to gate charge for 1) and 2). 
- Static attractions with an entertainment theme 
which could be considered comparables include 
the following: 
1) NBC Studio Tour (150,000) 
2) Country Music Hall of Fame (400,000) 
3) Graceland (500,000) 
4) Movieland Wax Museum (700,000?) 
• Sizing 
- Size is currently estimated at 40,000 square 
feet. 
- Hourly throughput capacity has not been 
established. 
BURBANK ENTERTAINMENT CENTER 
Proposed Attractions (cont.) 
CINEF ANT ASY 
• Concept 
- Gated attraction themed on science fiction. 
Specific attractions may include a special format 
theater and a museum of sci-fi movie 
memorabelia. 
- Narrow themed museum attractionsw which 
may be considered comparables include the 
following: 
1) 
